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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
VENUS ANN SHERARD, : Case No. 890383-CA 
Priority No. 2 
De fendant/Appe11ant. : 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In criminal cases, the trial court's broad discretion in 
conducting voir dire carries with it the minimal responsibility to 
address biases defined by statute, grounds justifying for-cause 
challenges. Trial courts have also been exhorted to pay heed to 
trial counsel's capacity to identify necessary voir dire questions. 
The trial court omitted questions underlying challenges for cause 
and other areas of legitimate concern identified by trial counsel. 
The questions omitted by the trial court were necessary to an 
adequate evaluation of the potential jurors in this case. 
The jurors in this case were given a confusing choice of 
two crimes that may not have been proved, according to the jurors' 
possible resolution of the evidence. Because the evidence is 
susceptible to an interpretation justifying a lesser included 
offense instruction, the jurors should have had the option of 
convicting Ms. Sherard of that lesser included offense, rather than 
the choice of convicting Ms. Sherard of one of the confusing 
unproved offenses or acquitting her altogether. 
An effort to marshal the evidence in the context of this 
case demonstrates that the prosecution failed in its burden to 
disprove self defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED IN ITS DUTY 
TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE. 
In response to Ms. Sherard's contentions that the voir dire 
was inadequate because it failed to probe juror affiliations with 
the victim's family, juror group affiliations, juror attitude toward 
alcohol use and violence, and juror exposure to press coverage, the 
State's arguments may be grouped as follows: 1) Ms. Sherard waived 
objections to the inadequacy of the voir dire; and 2) the questions 
omitted by the trial court were not factually significant to the 
verdict in this case. Appellee's brief at 23-29. 
A. IN CRIMINAL CASES, TRIAL COURTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTENT 
OF THE VOIR DIRES THEY CONDUCT. 
As noted previously, adequate voir dire is essential to 
fair trials, and is uniquely important in criminal cases where 
liberty is at stake. See Appellant's brief at 17-19 and 
accompanying footnotes. Hence, it is proper for this Court's 
analysis to focus on the Rule of Criminal Procedure designed to 
govern voir dire. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 allows trial courts to 
conduct voir dire, to conduct voir dire with the assistance of trial 
counsel, or to delegate the entire process to trial counsel. The 
rule states, in part, as follows: 
- 2 -
(b) The court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court may 
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems 
proper, or may itself submit to the prospective 
jurors additional questions requested by counsel 
or the defendant. 
(emphasis added). 
Under this rule, when trial courts opt to conduct voir 
dire, the trial courts are not even required by the rule to utilize 
supplemental voir dire from trial counsel in criminal cases, whereas 
in civil cases, trial courts and trial counsel always share 
responsibility for the voir dire.1 
The broad authority granted to trial courts by Rule 18 
reflects the legitimate expectation that trial courts are able to 
conduct a sufficient voir dire in criminal cases. As a guide for 
voir dire in criminal cases, the Rule sets forth the most elementary 
biases that preclude juror service in every case, the grounds 
supporting for-cause challenges. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
18(e). In addition to statutory definitions of bases for for-cause 
1. Compare the trial court's and counsel's shared 
responsibility for voir dire in civil cases: 
The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the latter event, the court 
shall permit the parties or their attorneys to 
supplement the examination by such further 
inquiry as is material and proper or shall itself 
submit to the prospective jurors such additional 
questions of the parties or their attorneys as is 
material and proper. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(a)(emphasis added). 
- 3 -
challenges, trial courts have been put on notice that trial 
counsels' familiarity with the evidence to be presented should be 
recognized as an asset to the process of formulating voir dire 
questions. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-845 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, the trial court chose to conduct voir dire, 
although defense counsel requested the opportunity to conduct the 
voir dire (R. 22, M.H. 19).2 In addition to the statutory notice of 
criteria for for-cause challenges, the trial court was made aware of 
additional areas of concern for voir dire — the trial court 
apparently used at least some of trial counsel's two sets of 
supplemental questions during the voir dire (T. 3-67). The trial 
court was reminded of the requests for supplemental questions when 
defense counsel referred to them in objecting to the inadequacy of 
the voir dire (T. 65-66). Defense counsel not only made a blanket 
objection to the absence of all requested questions (T. 65), but 
also made an effort to summarize the specific questions omitted by 
the trial court, indicating her belief that she had mentioned all of 
the omitted questions, but asking aloud what other questions had 
been omitted (T. 65-66).3 
2. The State indicates that because defense counsel did not 
renew the motion to conduct voir dire after the trial court denied 
it without prejudice, "defendant has waived this issue for purposes 
of appeal." Appellee's brief at 18. While Ms. Sherard has not 
raised the denial of the motion to conduct voir dire as an issue on 
appeal, it is noteworthy that under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
18(b), the trial court must always decide whether the court or 
counsel will conduct voir dire, regardless of any motion by counsel. 
3. The State argues that the omitted voir dire questions 
missing from trial counsel's litany are waived. Appellee's brief at 
(footnote continues) 
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After these comments and defense counsel's explanation that 
Ms. Sherard's exercise of challenges was compromised by the failure 
to ask the requested questions, the trial court did not ask any 
additional questions (T. 66-67).4 
(footnote 3 continued) 
23-29. It appears that when counsel was specifying the trial 
court's omissions, the specification was a mere formality, and that 
trial counsel's real opportunity to obtain additional questions came 
at the unrecorded bench conference (T. 40), after which the trial 
court asked additional questions (T. 40-49). See State v. Suarez, 
793 P.2d 934, 936 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(bench conferences should 
be recorded). 
Even if the shortcomings of court-conducted voir dire were 
properly attributed to defense counsel, but see Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 18(b), as a practical matter, trial counsel can 
pester a judge only so many times without trying the court's and 
jurors' patience beyond the limit. In requesting counsel-conducted 
voir dire, in then submitting two separate written sets of voir dire 
questions (which the trial court, by rule, did not have to use), in 
objecting at the bench conference to the trial court's failure to 
ask needed questions, in making a blanket objection to the absence 
of the supplemental questions, and in making an explicit effort to 
note every shortcoming in the trial court's voir dire, trial counsel 
performed admirably, if not dangerously. 
4. Compare Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(per curiam), a civil case, in which this Court declined to 
address the propriety of the voir dire in these circumstances: 
The record on appeal does not show how, in what 
context, or even whether the written questions 
were brought to the trial court's attention at 
the time of voir dire of the potential jurors. 
No objection to the failure to ask the allegedly 
proffered questions was made on the record. No 
mention was ever made by counsel at trial that 
any further examination of the jury panel was 
necessary. The proposed questions were never 
discussed on the record and no proffer was made 
that they were relevant or material. In fact, it 
is not entirely clear from the partial transcript 
that the trial court did not attempt to 
accommodate plaintiff's request by some 
alternately phrased inquiry. Furthermore, at the 
conclusion of the voir dire examination, 
appellant passed the jury for cause. 
Id. at 201. 
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When the trial court opted to conduct the voir dire in this 
criminal case, the trial court shouldered the responsibility for the 
content of the voir dire. The trial court was given notice of areas 
critical to the voir dire by the two sets of supplemental questions 
presented by defense counsel, and was responsible to address the 
valid concerns raised in those questions, and set forth in the 
statutory grounds for challenges for cause. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THIS VOIR DIRE. 
1. The trial court should have inquired about juror relations with 
Ruby Kelly's family members. 
The State argues that there is no record indication that 
Ruby Kelly's family posed a special concern at the time the case 
came to trial several months after Ruby Kelly's death. Appellee's 
brief at 24-25. A review of the record in this case casts question 
on the State's factual interpretations and assertions underlying 
this argument.5 
5. Compare Appellee's brief at 24, 
In 1987, there were some concerns that if 
defendant and the victim's family came into 
direct contact, a confrontation might result 
(R. 272 at 23-24, 29). But, even defense counsel 
recognized that this concern was not great but 
simply an emotional response to death (R. 272 at 
29) . 
(emphasis added), with M.H. 29, where defense counsel indicates that 
if Venus is housed in Delta, Utah, with the Bonner family, those 
threatening her safety would be unlikely to find and pursue her. 
Compare Appellee's brief at 24, 
Additionally, in 1987, there apparently was some 
media coverage of defendant's case (R. 22). 
However, there is no record support that any of 
the parties or the court had these same concerns 
in 1989, the date of trial. 
(footnote continues) 
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Even if the record did not reflect the unusual indications 
in this case that the relations between the injured parties and the 
jurors needed to be explored, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e) 
indicates that juror relationships with injured parties is a crucial 
concern to be addressed in every case. 
(footnote 5 continued) 
(emphasis added) with R. 98, 103, 160 (defense suggested voir dire 
questions concerning press coverage, filed in 1989); T. 50-53 (juror 
Donahue read about the case a week prior to voir dire); T. 62, 64 
(juror Malmstrom excused for cause because of exposure to press 
coverage). 
Compare Appellee's brief in footnote 7 on page 24, 
Defendant's assertion that the court threatened 
to clear the courtroom of Ruby Kelly's relatives 
does not bear scrutiny (Br. of App. at 21 n.13). 
(emphasis added), with Appellant's brief at 21, footnote 13: 
When Ruby Kelly's cousin, Vikki Salazar, was 
testifying in a manner supporting Venus' self 
defense, the trial court had to threaten to clear 
the courtroom because people in the courtroom 
were reacting inappropriately (T. 461). 
(emphasis added). For additional discussion of the general 
courtroom atmosphere, see T. 598 (prosecutor's argument focusing on 
audience in courtroom and not specific to Ruby Kelly's family, 
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, another important thing I'd like 
you to remember is that you're here to do justice. There are a lot 
of people in the audience here today. There's been quite a bit of 
concern about this case. The emotions have been high, people are 
very upset . . . " ) . 
The State takes issue with the characterization of Juror 
Martinez's statements to the court concerning his relations with 
Ruby Kelly's family members as "spontaneous": 
Further, defendant's assertion that a juror 
"spontaneously" informed the court of his 
relationship with the victim's brother is untrue 
(Br. of App. 23). The court had asked all the 
jurors previously if they knew the victim, Ruby 
Kelly, or a witness, Vikki Salazar, [footnote 8 
Vikki Salazar and Ruby Kelly were cousins 
(T. 461)] and had received a negative response 
(T. 16-19). Subsequently, while the court was 
(footnote continues) 
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(footnote 5 continued) 
questioning other jurors in chambers, prospective 
juror Martinez asked to speak to the court and, 
in chambers, reversed his previous answer. He 
informed the court that he was good friends with 
Ruby Kelly's brothers and his wife was Vikki 
Salazar's sister-in-law (T. 58). 
Appellee's brief at 24-25. The entirety of Juror Martinez's 
individual voir dire is as follows: 
Judge Young: The bailiff has informed me, 
Mr. Martinez, that when we took this recess that 
you indicated to him you desired to talk to the 
court because you think you may be familiar with 
some of the parties in this case. 
Mr. Martinez: Yes. 
Judge Young: With whom do you think you are 
familiar? 
Mr. Martinez: I know two of the brothers of 
the alleged victim. 
Judge Young: You know the Kelly brothers? 
Mr. Martinez: Anthony and Max Kelly. 
Judge Young: Would your acquaintance with 
Anthony and Max cause you for any reason to feel 
you would not be fair and impartial in this case? 
Mr. Martinez: I think so, sir. 
Judge Young: How close is your acquaintance 
with Anthony and Max? 
Mr. Martinez: Real good friends. 
Judge Young: Are they close to you in age? 
Mr. Martinez: Yes, I think they're about in 
their 30's or somewhere. I'm 38. 
Judge Young: All right. Have you been 
acquainted with them during much of your lifetime? 
Mr. Martinez: Well, since I married my 
wife. And that's been about four years. 
Judge Young: Is your wife more closely 
acquainted to the Kellys than you? 
Mr. Martinez: Yes. Her sister in law knows 
'em really good. Her sister-in-law is Vikki 
Salazar. And I think her last name was Kelly too. 
Judge Young: Thank you, Mr. Martinez. We 
appreciate your letting us know. You may be 
excused. 
(T. 58-59). 
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2. The trial court should have inquired further about juror group 
affiliations, and attitudes toward alcohol and violence. 
The State's primary argument concerning the scope of voir 
dire concerning juror group affiliations, and attitudes toward 
alcohol and violence is that the questions do not have a sufficient 
nexus to the disputed issues in this case. Appellee's brief at 
25-28. 
The purpose of the voir dire is not limited to probing 
juror attitudes toward facts and issues in dispute in a given case. 
Indeed, voir dire is designed to prevent the service of jurors whose 
attitudes toward non-critical facts might prevent the jurors from 
focusing fairly on relevant issues. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 
(Utah 1988). 
Much like the question concerning juror relations with Ruby 
Kelly's family members, questions concerning juror group 
affiliations might have supported a challenge for cause in this case 
involving rival gangs. See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
18(e)(4). The questions concerning juror attitudes toward alcohol 
and violence do have sufficient factual connection to this case, and 
would have informed the exercise of peremptory challenges. Under 
governing standards, the questions should have been asked. State v. 
Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984). 
The State contends that the trial court's asking the jurors 
if they thought consumption of alcohol to be "morally wrong" "in all 
cases and under all circumstances" was an adequate means of 
assessing whether jurors would be offended by the alcohol-related 
- 9 -
facts in this case. Conversely, the State argues that Ms. Sherard's 
supplemental questions concerning group affiliations were not 
sufficiently specific to evoke juror responses concerning gang 
affiliations. Appellee's brief at 26-27. Successful voir dire 
requires more subtlety than is reflected in the trial court's 
question concerning alcohol use, such as that reflected in the 
general group affiliation questions suggested by defense counsel. 
See State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 844-845 (Utah 1988)(voir dire 
questions must be crafted with care in order to evoke evidence of 
latent biases). 
It has never been Ms. Sherard's contention that "the court 
did not inquire of the jurors as to their involvement in fist 
fights." Appellee's brief at 28. Compare Appellant's brief at 
24-26. Rather, it is Ms. Sherard's contention that the scope of the 
trial court's voir dire concerning violence was inadequate. For 
instance, despite the evidence that Ms. Sherard had physical fights 
with at least four women on the night of Ruby Kelly's death, the 
trial court never probed juror attitudes toward physical violence 
between females, as suggested in supplemental voir dire question 28. 
3. The trial court should have inquired further about juror exposure 
to press coverage. 
The State argues that there is no indication that press 
coverage was a legitimate concern at the time this case was tried, 
almost two years after the death of Ruby Kelly. Appellee's brief at 
28-29. The concern about press coverage is clearly evidenced in 
1987. E.g. R. 24 and 29 (request for counsel-conducted voir dire 
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based in part on press coverage), T. 31-32 (trial court discussion 
of press-generated rumors about the case). The press coverage is 
also mentioned in the original 1989 set of voir dire questions 
(R. 98, 103), and in the amended set filed the day before trial 
(R. 160). 
The fact that Juror Malmstrom recalled the press coverage 
of the case from 1987 is some indication that the remoteness of Ruby 
Kelly's death to the trial does not dissipate the concern about the 
press coverage of the case. Juror Donahue had read two articles in 
the week prior to the voir dire and could not remember which of the 
facts he recalled applied to Ms. Sherard's case (T. 50-53). Compare 
Appellee's brief at 28-29 ("Juror Donahue, who was not sure if he 
had read about defendant's case or another one, discussed the matter 
in chambers and was not challenged for cause by defendant.").6 
Given that the trial court asked the jurors if they had 
been exposed to press coverage about "this case" when the jurors 
knew nothing about this case other than Ms. Sherard's name, the 
names of the expected witnesses, and that the case involved 
homicide, it is fortuitous that any of the jurors were able to 
discern what case the court was discussing in inquiring about press 
coverage. 
6. Juror Donahue's service on the jury is explained by his 
answers to the voir dire questions, indicating an appreciation for 
Ms. Sherard's difficult childhood (T. 50-53), and should not be 
interpreted as an indication that Ms. Sherard was not concerned 
about the press coverage in this case. See also T. 62, 64, where 
Juror Malmstrom was removed for cause because of her exposure to the 
press. 
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4. Ms, Sherard has demonstrated an abuse of discretion requiring a 
new trial with an adequate voir dire. 
"All that is necessary for a voir dire question to be 
appropriate is that it allow 'defense counsel to exercise 
his peremptory challenges more intelligently.'" 
State v. Hall, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 38 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990), quoting State v. Worthen, 
765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988), quoting State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 
1060 (Utah 1984). 
Ms. Sherard has identified numerous appropriate questions 
which the trial court failed to ask. When the entire voir dire is 
viewed as a whole, the absence of these key questions demonstrates 
that the trial court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire. 
Ms. Sherard is entitled to be tried before a jury that is selected 
fairly, and reversal is therefore required.7 
7. Ms. Sherard is aware of Utah cases in which the 
prejudice arising from a deficient voir dire is evident from the 
record. E.g. State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984)(voir dire 
deficient concerning alcohol abstention; non-drinking juror sat on 
jury panel); State v. Hall, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990)(voir dire deficient 
concerning relationships with county attorney's office; jury foreman 
related to deputy county attorney). 
However, such explicit proof of prejudice is rarely 
available in cases in which the paucity of information about the 
jurors is the issue. See Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(civil case reversed for 
inadequate voir dire without any discussion of jurors who served in 
case). See also State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 
1988)(discussing proof of truth of religious beliefs, relying on 
article I section 7 of Utah Constitution and the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution, the court indicated 
that saddling a defendant with proof of the unprovable would be "an 
obvious unfairness of the most fundamental kind."); Peters v. Kiff, 
407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972)(plurality opinion)(prejudice caused by 
racist jury selection is presumed because prejudice is difficult to 
prove, yet harm caused by racist jury selection is extensive and 
pervasive). 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED 
THE JURORS ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
The State agrees that the first part of the Baker lesser 
included offense test is met in this case — the statutory elements 
of negligent homicide qualify it as a lesser included offense of 
second degree homicide. Appellee's brief at 31. 
A. THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO MS. SHERARD, 
COULD SUPPORT ACQUITTING HER OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE AND 
CONVICTING HER OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
The next part of the Baker test requires evaluating the 
evidence in this case to determine if any reasonable view of the 
evidence would support acquitting Ms. Sherard of second degree 
homicide and convicting her of negligent homicide. £d. In 
evaluating this aspect of the Baker test, this Court must view the 
evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Ms. Sherard. E.g. State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 449, 
451 (Utah 1986). 
The State agrees that Ms. Sherard's statement to Detective 
Mendez during the investigation of Ruby Kelly's death supports a 
negligent homicide theory, but argues that Ms. Sherard's trial 
testimony disavows her statement to Officer Mendez that she did not 
know she had a knife in her hand when she was fighting with Ruby 
Kelly. Appellee's brief at 33. The trial prosecutor apparently did 
not feel that Ms. Sherard had abandoned the theory that she did not 
know she had a knife in her hand. E.g. T. 585-586 ("Maybe she 
didn't know what was cold and hard in her hand was a knife.11). More 
- 13 -
importantly, Ms. Sherard's assessment at trial that "common sense 
says" she had a knife in her hand does not rule out the possibility 
that some two years prior to trial during the altercation with Ruby 
Kelly and the surrounding crowd, Venus did not know that what she 
had been handed was a knife. Other support for the negligent 
homicide instruction is addressed at pages 39 through 41 of 
Appellant's brief. 
Viewing all evidence and inferences in favor of the 
negligent homicide theory, the jury should have been allowed to 
determine whether, during the events on the night of Ruby Kelly's 
death, Venus failed to perceive the risk posed by the object she had 
been handed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE THE NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
INSTRUCTION IS PREJUDICIAL. 
The real question before this Court on the lesser included 
offense issue is the harmless error question. Because the improper 
denial of a lesser included offense instruction is a violation of 
the constitutional right to due process, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152, 157 (Utah 1983), this Court must reverse the conviction unless 
the error can be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). 
1. The trial court should have given the jurors the option to 
convict Ms. Sherard of the lesser included offense, rather than 
forcing them to choose between acquittal and an unproven offense. 
Most important to the proper resolution of the harmless 
error question in this case is consideration of why lesser included 
offenses are considered part of a defendant's right to due process: 
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"[I]t has long been recognized that [the 
lesser included offense] can be beneficial to the 
defendant because it affords the jury a less 
drastic alternative than the choice between 
conviction of the offense charged and acquittal.11 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983)(brackets by the Baker 
court), quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980). The 
Baker court explained the dangers present when the jurors are left 
without sufficient options from which to choose: 
"True, if the prosecution has not established 
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the 
offense charged, and if no lesser offense 
instruction is offered, the jury must, as a 
theoretical matter, return a verdict of 
acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a 
lesser offense instruction — in this context or 
any other — precisely because he should not be 
exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's 
practice will diverge from theory. Where one of 
the elements of the offense charged remains in 
doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of 
some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its 
doubts in favor of conviction." 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 156-157, quoting Keeble v. United States. 412 
U.S. 205, 212-213 (1973) (emphasis original). 
The jurors in this case may have believed that Venus 
Sherard's most accurate perceptions of her state of mind during the 
fighting were articulated during the interview with Detective Mendez 
on the day after the fighting, when Venus indicated that she did not 
know that she had been handed a knife. Her misidentification of the 
person who handed her the knife when she spoke with Officer Mendez 
supports the conclusion that Venus was not acting with full 
awareness when she fought with Ruby Kelly. The jurors heard a tape 
recording of that interview, which has been certified as part of the 
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appellate record and which this Court is encouraged to hear. A 
transcript of the interview appears in Appendix 4 to the opening 
Appellant's brief. If the jurors believed that Venus did not know 
that she had a knife in her hand when she was fighting with Ruby 
Kelly, and thus did not perceive the risk or intend to seriously 
harm or kill Ruby Kelly, the jurors could not legally have convicted 
Venus of second degree homicide or manslaughter. Yet faced with the 
tragic death of Ruby Kelly and the unusual circumstances of this 
case, the jurors may have felt compelled to convict Ms. Sherard of 
one of the available charges. 
Because the trial court's denial of the negligent homicide 
instruction deprived the jury of the opportunity to fairly 
adjudicate the facts of this case, reversal is required. 
2. Because the jurors may not have understood the second degree 
homicide and manslaughter theories charged in this case, the second 
degree homicide conviction does not support the inference that they 
would have rejected the negligent homicide verdict. 
The fact that the jurors convicted Ms. Sherard of second 
degree homicide, rather than manslaughter, is not dispositive of the 
harmless error question unless it is safe to assume that the jurors 
understood the differences between second degree homicide and 
manslaughter. Cf. Brief of Appellee at 34 ("By convicting defendant 
of the greater offense, the jury necessarily considered and rejected 
defendant's argument that she acted with any lesser mental state 
than that associated with second degree murder.11). Such an 
assumption is particularly unfounded in the circumstances of this 
case. 
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The jurors were instructed on all variations of second 
degree homicide and all variations of manslaughter (R. 226, 228, 
229, 230, 238), A copy of pertinent jury instructions are contained 
in Appendix 1 to this brief, and the full set of jury instructions 
is contained in the appendix to Appellee's brief. 
During deliberations, the jurors apparently asked the trial 
court the differences between second degree homicide and 
manslaughter (R. 199).8 Rather than directing the jurors to the 
instructions differentiating between the various theories behind the 
two charges, the trial court simply referred the jurors back to the 
elements instructions 29 and 31. The trial court did not refer the 
jurors to instruction 33, which contains language differentiating 
between depraved indifference second degree homicide and reckless 
manslaughter,9 and did not refer the jurors to instruction 41, which 
explains how what might be a second degree homicide translates into 
8. The fact that the jurors asked about the differences 
between second degree homicide and manslaughter may demonstrate that 
the jurors were not immediately committed to the second degree 
homicide charge. The jurors were instructed to consider the second 
degree homicide instruction first and consider the manslaughter 
charge in the absence of a verdict of guilt on the second degree 
homicide charge, although the instruction was permissive, rather 
than mandatory (R. 225). The second degree homicide elements 
instruction informed the jurors that if they found all of the 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, they "must find the defendant 
guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree as charged in the Information." (R. 226). 
9. In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), the 
court canvassed the history of appellate court confusion over the 
distinctions to be drawn between second degree homicide and 
manslaughter, and concluded that jury must be instructed on the 
primary distinction between depraved indifference second degree 
homicide and reckless manslaughter, that the level of risk of death 
is higher for second degree depraved indifference homicide. Id. at 
258-264. 
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manslaughter in cases involving an extreme emotional disturbance, 
and in cases involving an imperfect self-defense. The trial court 
did not direct the jurors to instruction 35, defining the various 
levels of intent distinguishing the various theories of homicide and 
manslaughter. 
A copy of the jury question and the trial court's answer 
are contained in Appendix 2 to this brief. The transcript contains 
no discussion of this occurrence.10 
The jurors' possible misunderstanding of the differences 
between manslaughter and second degree homicide is an additional 
reason why the absence of the negligent homicide instruction should 
not be considered harmless error. 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION. 
Ms. Sherard recognizes this Court's requirement that 
defendants raising insufficient evidence issues marshal the 
10. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) governs the 
procedure to be followed when jurors ask legal questions during 
deliberations. It states, 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, 
if they desire to be informed on any point of law 
arising in the cause, they shall inform the 
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate 
such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court 
where, in the presence of the defendant and both 
counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry 
or advise the jury that no further instructions 
shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion 
respond to the inquiry in writing without having 
the jury brought before the court, in which case 
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be 
entered in the record. 
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evidence. State v. Moore. 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 32 (Utah App. 
1990). With proper respect due to the role of the jury and with an 
eye to this Court's formidable task of writing the facts for the 
opinion in this case, see id., Ms. Sherard proffers Table 1 from her 
opening brief as a marshalling of the evidence. The table presents 
the evidence with record citations in a manner that allows this 
Court to see the key factual agreements and disputes which are the 
basis of Ms. Sherard's position that the State failed in its burden 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense. See 
State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985)(discussing State's burden 
to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt); 
State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah 1989)(conviction supported by 
some evidence (uncorroborated hearsay statement); court reversed 
conviction on ground of insufficient evidence). 
Disregarding the first three questions in the table, which 
relate to the jury function of resolving credibility (Bias? 
Inconsistent statements? Taking drugs or alcohol at party?), this 
Court can see from the table that the vast majority of the evidence 
supports Venus Sherard7s self-defense. While one could snatch 
segments of testimony of the witnesses and create a theory 
supporting Ms. Sherard's conviction, one could not do so without 
speculation, or in good conscience, given the melee of evidence in 
this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Ms. Sherard's conviction and 
order this case dismissed. At the very least, Ms. Sherard in 
entitled to a new trial with a jury that is selected fairly and 
instructed adequately. 
Respectfully submitted this Jy /^day of February, 
1991. 
^ f * * 
JAM^S CA3RADSHAW 
Attorney for Ms. Sherard 
<ZfaC'Ci)aff)( 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Ms. Sherard 
I HOLBROOK 
>r Ms. Sherard 
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Jury Instructions on Second Degree Homicide 
and Manslaughter 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You may give consideration to all the possible verdicts, 
but you should begin your deliberations by considering the offense 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree. 
Unless all of you agree to find the defendant guilty of 
the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, you 
may consider the other offenses upon which I have instructed you 
in the order in which the instructions were given. You may 
consider any of those offenses without having reached agreement 
concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence on any other of 
them. The purpose of this instruction is to aid and not to 
control your deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 7 
Before you can convict the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard, 
of the crime of Criminal Homicide - Murder in the Second Degree, 
as charged in the Information on file in this case, you roust find 
from all of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 7th day of March, 1987, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard, 
caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and 
2. That said defendant then and there did so: (a) 
intentionally or knowingly; or (b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, she committed an act clearly dangerous 
to human life; or (c) knowingly acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, she engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk to death to another; 
3. That said defendant caused the death in an unlawful 
manner and without justification. 
If you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree as charged in the Information. 
If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed 
to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _%fi 
You are instructed that Manslaughter is a lesser included 
offense of Criminal Homicide - Murder in the Second Degree. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Z f 
Before you can convict the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard, 
of the crime of Criminal Homicide - Manslaughter, a lesser 
included offense, you must find from all of the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that offense. 
1. That on or about the 7th day of March, 1987, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard, 
caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and 
2. That said defendant then and there did so: (a) 
recklessly; or (b) knowingly or intentionally, but was under the 
influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or (c) knowingly or 
intentionally reasonably believing the circumstances provided a 
legal justification or excuse for her conduct for which no legal 
justification or excuse existed under the then existing 
circumstances; 
3. That said defendant then and there caused the death 
in an unlawful manner and without justification. 
If you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide -
Manslaughter, a lesser included offense. 
If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed 
to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2L±T 
If you find from the evidence that you must determine 
whether or not to convict the defendant of the crime of 
Manslaughter, you are instructed that in considering whether the 
defendant caused the death of another under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance, such an emotional disturbance does 
not include a condition resulting from mental illness. 
The "extreme emotional disturbance" must be triggered by 
something external from the accused, and her reaction to such 
external stimulus must be reasonable, and the terms must be given 
the meaning you would give them in common everyday use. Such 
disturbance, therefore, cannot have been brought about by her own 
peculiar mental processes or by her own knowing or intentional 
involvement in another crime. 
The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse mitigates 
a death caused by the defendant under the influence of extreme 
emotional disturbance or the reasonableness of the belief that a 
legal justification or excuse exists for legally unjustifiable or 
excusable conduct is to be determined from the view point of a 
reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^>2> 
The term "depraved indif f erence11 means an utter 
callousness toward the value of human life and a complete and 
total indifference as to whether one!s conduct will create the 
highly likely probability that death will result from a risk that 
the defendant knowingly creates. 
More than recklessness is required, but rather in order 
to convict the defendant under this mental state to constitute 
Murder in the Second Degree, you must find (1) that the defendant 
acted knowingly, (2) in creating a grave risk of death, (3) that 
the defendant knew the risk was grave, (4) which means a highly 
likely probability of death, and (5) that the conduct evidenced 
an utter callousness and indifference toward human life. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3^~~ 
You are instructed that a person engaged in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willful-
ly with respect to the nature of her con-
duct or to a result of her conduct, when 
it is her conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the re-
sult. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with re-
spect to her conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding her conduct when she is aware 
of the nature of her conduct or the exist-
ing circumstances. A person acts knowing-
ly, or with knowledge, with respect to a 
result of her conduct when she is aware 
that her conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly...with respect to circumstanc-
es surrounding her conduct or the result 
of his conduct when she is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that 
its disregard constitutes a gross devia-
tion from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all 
the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor1s standpoint. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
When a homicide which would otherwise be murder in the 
second degree is committed under the influence of an extreme 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse then the offense constitutes manslaughter. 
Likewise when a homicide which would otherwise be murder in 
the second degree is committed when the defendant reasonably 
believed the circumstances provided a legal justification which did 
not exist then the offense constitutes Manslaughter. 
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